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Introduction
There are a number of recent harrowing films about the Rwandan
massacres of 1994. In Shooting Dogs (2005), the hero, played by John
Hurt, is a Catholic priest named Fr. Christopher, who finds himself
entrapped in a school compound with several thousand Tutsi villagers.
They are encamped there under the protection of the UN troops, only
to find that the troops are expecting an order to withdraw. Outside
the compound gates, their erstwhile neighbours, armed with machetes
and clubs, await the exit of the UN monitors. As the inevitability of
their fate becomes apparent, the trapped villagers ask the troops if
they would at least shoot their children, so as to spare them being
butchered; the soldiers, not surprisingly, are unable to perform even
this act of “mercy”. The priest has a chance to get on the trucks with
the troops, but he insists on staying with the people. He is shot dead.
Earlier in the film, at the height of the tension in the compound, he
prepares to celebrate Mass. ‘I am a priest. This is what I do’, he shrugs
to the volunteer teacher who wonders about the appropriateness of
celebrating in such circumstances. His repeated appeals to the UN
commander to intervene in the massacres which are taking place
yards away from the compound gates are ignored. On being told yet
again that the troops are there as monitors only, and have no mandate
for peacekeeping, Fr. Christopher explodes: ‘Might I suggest that you
get in touch with your superiors and change your f—— mandate!’
‘I am a priest, this is what I do’; there is never a question of
this impressive priest abandoning his people to their horrific fate. By
opposing this act of love to the “acts of genocide”, there is a reminder
of the dimensions of Eucharist brought out, for example, by William
T. Cavanaugh’s description of torture (in this case as practised by
the Pinochet regime in Chile in the 70s) as an “anti-liturgy”, to be
contradicted by the Church’s practice of “Eucharist”.1 What happens
1 W.T. Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist (Blackwell, Oxford, 1998). A central theme
in Cavanaugh’s argument is that the Church had allowed itself to ‘disappear’ from Chilean
political life because of a mistaken understanding of how it should relate to society. Only
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outside the compound fence in Shooting Dogs is a diabolical parody
of the gathering which takes place inside. The eucharistic logic: ‘we
are priests; this is what we do’ can only be fully understood in relation
to its opposite: because the butchery and exclusion are also ‘what we
do’, there is a need for Eucharist.
Thankfully, very few of our eucharistic celebrations are conducted
explicitly against such a background. For the most part we have to
consciously remind ourselves that what is being celebrated is the ‘dan-
gerous memory of Jesus Christ’,2 and that our Eucharist is, among
other things, a call upon the powers to ‘change your mandate’. I wish
to propose that any authentic understanding of “sacrifice” in relation
to Eucharist cannot stray too far from this memory; even if some of
the aporias regarding sacrifice may remain unresolved. As Chauvet
declares, ‘there is no doubt that the word “sacrifice” is one of the
most treacherous in the Christian vocabulary’.3 He acknowledges the
low esteem in which the term is held by many contemporary Chris-
tians: the Freudian view of religion as simply the management of
guilt is never far away – perhaps even more so when we think we
have overcome and outgrown its distortions. Two authors – Dennis
Keenan, a philosopher, and John Milbank, a theologian – help set the
scene by offering historical overviews of theories of sacrifice, and
in so doing alert us to this paradox of our culture’s imperative to
‘sacrifice sacrifice’.4 In particular Milbank warns us of the danger of
entangling ourselves in sacrificial reasoning, even as we think we are
escaping from it.
Regarding the contemporary discussion, three broad theological
camps can be discerned: firstly, theories which insist that what is
valuable or authentic in Christianity is incompatible with sacrifice,
and that the contrast between the Christian and non-Christian dispen-
sation in this respect is so vast as to make any notion of a Chris-
tian understanding of “sacrifice” illegitimate. This is a classic theme
of liberation theologians, who see in the critique of the prophets a
by recovering its ability to practise Eucharist was the Church able to overcome its ‘invisi-
bility’. As an iconic example of such ‘eucharistic practice’, Cavanaugh cites the decision by
Archbishop Romero (after the assassination of Fr Rutilio Grande) to have just one Eucharis-
tic celebration in San Salvador, in order to voice, to the entire nation, his condemnation of
human rights violations.
2 The phrase is taken from Johann Baptist Metz. For an appraisal of the eucharistic
dimension of Metz’s political theology, see Bruce T. Morrill, Anamnesis and Dangerous
Memory: Political and Liturgical Theology in Dialogue (Liturgical Press, Collegeville, Mn.,
2000).
3 Louis-Marie Chauvet, (1995), Symbol and Sacrament: A Sacramental Reinterpretation
of Christian Existence (Liturgical Press, Collegeville, 1995), p. 315.
4 Dennis King Keenan, ‘The Sacrifice of the Eucharist’, Heythrop Journal 44.2 (2003),
pp. 182-2-4 and The Question of Sacrifice (Indiana University Press, Bloomington &
Indianapolis, 2005); John Milbank, (1996), ‘Stories of Sacrifice: From Wellhausen to
Girard’, Modern Theology 12 (1996), pp. 27–56.
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rejection of cult in favour of practical justice. Jesus’ insistence on the
importance of ‘mercy not sacrifice’ is seen as a continuation and con-
firmation of this basic attitude. There are also important critiques of
sacrifice from feminist theology: the best known are perhaps from
Nancy Jay,5 Luce Irigaray, Julia Kristeva. These “non-sacrificial”
approaches contrast directly with a second perspective, typified by
Margaret Barker and Bruce Chilton, and their assertion that Jesus’
identity as High Priest is crucial to early Christian self-understanding,
and not peripheral, as the anti-cult protesters would maintain.6
The third, and arguably mainstream position, is to allow for a Chris-
tian usage of sacrifice, but with severe qualification, namely with a
recognition that the notion has undergone a process of radical ‘spir-
itualization’ or interiorization. Since theories of this third type often
agree that Christianity brings about the ‘end’ of sacrifice, meaning
both its fulfilment and termination, there can sometimes be little dif-
ference between an espousal of a transformed notion of sacrifice and
the first, non-sacrificial position. I propose to follow Louis-Marie
Chauvet in designating this third approach as ‘anti-sacrificial’; the
terminology is potentially confusing, but what it seeks to convey is
the recognition that Christian sacrifice can only be understood in
tensile contrast with another category: ‘sacrifice in the “history-of-
religions” sense of the word’ (Robert Daly). So the term intends to
convey a process of development, with elements of continuity as well
as rupture.
Part One of this paper offers a more specific investigation within
the parameters of the ‘anti-sacrificial’ approach defined by Chauvet.
Robert Daly proposes a distinction between ‘normative’ and ‘descrip-
tive’ meanings of Christianity and sacrifice; he argues that ‘sacrifice’
has undergone a process of what he calls ‘spiritualization’, and it
is this process which is of prime importance. His analysis coincides
largely with those of Keenan and Chauvet. In the second section of
this paper I seek to problematise this ‘exodus from sacrifice’. I will
note, in passing, two specific and contrasting concerns: firstly, the per-
sistence of (sometimes extreme) propitiatory views of the atonement
(expressed most vividly in the controversy surrounding Mel Gibson’s
film The Passion of the Christ), and the fears of reductionism ex-
pressed by Pope John Paul II in Eucharistia de Ecclesia. I will note
the pastoral imperative of how to speak effectively of eucharistic sac-
rifice within and to a culture that maintains a morbid fascination with
5 Nancy Jay, Throughout Your Generations For Ever: Sacrifice, Religion and Pater-
nity (University of Chicago Press, 1992); especially chapter 9, ‘Theories of Sacrifice’,
pp. 128–146.
6 Margaret Barker, (2003), The Great High Priest: The Temple Roots of Christian
Liturgy (T & T Clark, London, 2003); Bruce Chilton, The Temple of Jesus: His Sacrificial
Program within a Cultural History of Sacrifice (University Park, Pennsylvania, 1992).
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the theme of sacrifice as immolation, as well as an understandably
deep-seated resistance to it. For all the criticisms advanced against it,
sacrifice remains one of the key metaphors of salvation. David Ford
(in Self and Salvation, CUP 1998) offers six criteria for an adequate
soteriology: I will ask whether our understanding of eucharistic sac-
rifice can be reformulated so as to better satisfy these criteria. My
specific proposal is that an articulation of the Johannine notion of the
pedagogy of filiation may actually do much of the work which we
require from the doctrine of sacrifice.
Part One: The Exodus from Sacrifice
Dennis King Keenan traces in the genealogy of Western sacrifice ‘an
increasing interiorization, spiritualization, and dialecticization of sac-
rifice’, understood as a necessary passage through suffering and/or
death on the way to a supreme moment of transcendental truth. As
such there is a pay-off, and sacrifice can be seen in an economi-
cal sense. And yet we also expect a “pure” sacrifice to be beyond
calculation or hope of gain, a selfless and disinterested act, so that
the economical and aneconomical meanings of sacrifice work against
one another. What happens is that the latter, the aneconomical, is
‘inevitably’ sublated by an economical approach. Keenan gives the
example of Matthew, chapter 6, where sacrificial actions undertaken
without hope of terrestrial recognition (prayer, fasting, almsgiving),
are nevertheless seen, and rewarded, by your Father ‘who is in secret’.
He begins this task of questioning sacrifice with a genealogy of
theories, uncovering a number of systematically distorting structural
features, namely economics, sexism and Christo-centric evolutionism.
This widespread distortion would seem to argue for an abandonment
of discourse about sacrifice altogether. However, says Keenan, such
an abandonment would be,
a sacrifice of sacrifice, which, if performed naively (i.e., without
dwelling with the question of sacrifice), would unwittingly preserve
some form of sacrifice. One would be duped into believing that one
could be done with sacrifice, which could then return (relatively un-
changed) in far more subtle and pernicious forms . . . one is called
to remain attentive to the irreducible ambiguity of the sacrifice of
sacrifice.7
What is called for instead is a genealogy and a ‘going through’ of the
tradition, one which is alert to the distorting principles of economics,
sexism and evolutionism, but more generally to the radical ambiguity
of ‘the question of sacrifice’ as set out above. John Milbank draws
7 D.K. Keenan (2005) p. 14.
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similar conclusions from his survey of recent attempts at the ‘quest
for sacrifice’. He sees these authors (Rene´ Girard, Walter Burkert,
Maurice Bloch, Nancy Jay, Luce Irigaray and others) continuing a
distorted nineteenth-century obsession. ‘Why is it that sacrifice should
have exercised such a lure upon Victorian discourses, to the degree
that they were “framed” by what they purport to “frame”, seduced
by the object of their own fascination?’8
Their approach presents a fearful temptation for Christians, one
which involves ‘a confusion of evolutionism (any account of a neces-
sitated history) with typology, or the idea that the Cross and eucharist
both end and fulfil all sacrifice’. This latter claim to fulfilment is
indeed correct, says Milbank – but not by virtue of a demonstrated
necessity or logical unfolding. It is this uneasiness which shapes Mil-
bank’s appraisal of the ‘renewal’ of the nineteenth-century quest in
writers such as Rene´ Girard, whose work he considers in detail as
representative of this renewed quest. Milbank advances a number of
criticisms against Girard, and while some are nearer the mark than
others, the general drift is clear; that Girard is one of those ‘modern,
enlightened reasoners about sacrifice [who have] found themselves
captured by sacrificial reason’, thereby substituting themselves for the
old priests as the new, scientific priests. Whatever the justice of this
critique as a reading of Girard, we need to note Milbank’s general
points regarding the peculiar temptations which face contemporary
theorists of sacrifice.
It is also worth noting, however, that Girard’s original ‘non-
sacrificial’ approach has been explicitly modified in his subsequent
work.9 His position now is that the term can only be understood in its
transformative history: what in the context of this paper corresponds
to the third position designated by Chauvet as ‘anti-sacrifice’, but
which may more helpfully be thought of as an ‘exodus from sacri-
fice’ (Keenan). McKenna describes this ‘strong scholarly consensus’
that the Christian usage of sacrifice is to be understood in the context
of a long process of ‘spiritualization’, both in the Jewish scriptures
and in the surrounding Hellenistic culture. Under pressure of the con-
ditions of exile, and also of the prophetic critique of cult, ‘sacrifice’
evolved from the notion of a material immolation (destruction) rit-
ual, towards a more spiritual prayer form, for which no immolation
was necessary.10 Keenan concurs with this description when he traces
8 J. Milbank (1996) p. 31.
9 Girard admits that in Des Choses Cache¯es (1978) his impatience to stress the unique-
ness of the biblical revelation over against sacrifice caused him to “scapegoat” both the
concept itself, and the “sacrificial” letter to the Hebrews (for Girard’s change of mind on
the question of sacrifice, see James Williams (ed), The Girard Reader (Crossroad, NY,
1996).
10 John H. McKenna, ‘Eucharist and Sacrifice: An Overview’, Worship, 76.5 (2002) pp.
386–402. See also William R. Franklin, ‘ARC-USA: Five Affirmations on the eucharist as
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an increasing concern with interior disposition in the Israelite cult,
through the critique of the prophets, the psalms, and in the later Wis-
dom literature. ‘The progressive interiorization and spiritualization of
sacrifice did not, however, represent a repudiation of sacrifice, rather
the necessity of the proper interior disposition accompanying the out-
ward act.’11
‘Spiritualization’ for Robert Daly denotes an interiorization of the
movement of ‘offering’ demanded in earlier ritual sacrificial acts. He
asserts that Christian sacrifice was not a cultic but rather an ethi-
cal idea, one which found its focus in the everyday practical life of
Christian virtue. He goes on to offer a number of synonyms: demateri-
alising, sublimating, humanizing, deepening, ethicizing, rationalizing,
interiorizing, symbolizing. These are broad terms which include ‘all
those movements within Judaism and Christianity which attempted to
emphasize the true meaning of sacrifice, that is, the inner, spiritual,
or ethical significance of the cult over against the merely material or
merely external understanding of it’.12 (1978:7) Daly’s argument rests
upon a distinction between normative and descriptive understandings
of both Christianity and sacrifice. The proposition ‘Christianity is sac-
rificial’, can have two correct and diametrically opposite meanings,
depending on whether the words are taken in a normative or descrip-
tive/phenomenological sense (rather as one might speak of the ideals
of socialism and ‘real existing socialism’, perhaps). He grounds his
understanding of ‘normative’ Christianity as ‘normatively’ sacrificial
on his conviction that ‘the Christ Event has done away with sacri-
fice in the comparative-religions or history-of-religions sense of that
word’. Only in five New Testament passages do we find references
to sacrifice which are relevant to our inquiry: Romans 12.1-2, and
Romans 15.15-16; 1 Peter 2.4-10; Hebrews 10.19-25; and Hebrews
13.10-16. Daly repeats the conclusion set out in his 1978 study:
The commonly accepted methods of modern critical scholarship prove
beyond reasonable doubt that this primarily ethical concept of Christian
sacrifice is indeed the one that is operative in the New Testament . . . in
each [of these five passages], either explicitly or implicitly (from the
fact that they all occur in the context of practical exhortation), sacrifice
is understood as the practical living of the life of Christian virtue and
Christian mission. The core of the specifically New Testament concept
of Christian sacrifice is, thus, not cultic or liturgical, but practical and
Sacrifice’, Worship, 69 (1995) pp. 386–390; Joanne M. Pierce, (1995), ‘The Eucharist
as Sacrifice: Some Contemporary Roman Catholic Reflections’, Worship, 69.5 (1995)
pp. 394–405; David Power, The Eucharistic Mystery: Revitalising the Tradition
(Crossroad, NY, 1992); David Power et al., ‘Sacramental Theology: A Review of
Literature’ Theological Studies, 55 (1994) pp. 657–702.
11 D.K. Keenan (2003) p. 189.
12 Robert Daly, The Origins of the Christian Doctrine of Sacrifice (Fortress Press,
Philadelphia, 1978) p. 7.
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ethical. The sacrifice to be offered by the people of God in the new
covenant is indeed a ‘liturgy of life’.13
The inchoate acceptance of sacrificial thinking becomes explicit with
Origen and Augustine; here we have a faithful development of the
main trajectory of ‘spiritualization’ which Daly has detected in the
New Testament epistles. As noted above, ‘spiritualization’ has sev-
eral synonyms, though in the developed Christian sense spiritualize
came to mean, effectively, ‘Christologize’.14 At the same time, there
is another trajectory which develops, a more ominous one of ritual-
ization or institutionalization: Christians begin to speak in a univocal
way of the redemptive activity of Christ, and of their own liturgical
activity, as sacrificial. From Hippolytus onwards we begin to hear of
the sacrifical action of the presiding priest, and of the bread and wine
spoken of as sacrificial offerings. The problem according to Daly is
that the patristic authors looked to the past for the origins of sacri-
fice, but ‘had no epistemic access to the process of spiritualization’,
indeed may have had no idea that it existed. Not the Old Testament,
read ahistorically, but the later writings and the oral traditions of in-
tertestamental and early rabbinic Judaism were the places where the
process of spiritualization was recorded.15
L.-M. Chauvet concurs with the broad outlines of Robert Daly’s ap-
proach. He declares that the interpretation of Jesus’ life and death as
a sacrifice is neither the earliest, nor the most important, in the New
Testament. Chauvet follows Le´on-Dufour’s description of three ma-
jor symbolisms in Paul’s theology (judicial, political, inter-personal),
none of which have to do with sacrifice or cult. The Letter to the
Hebrews does interpret the death of Jesus through the language of
the Temple, but it is very much a transmutation or subversion of
the Old Testament cult, whereby the priesthood of Jesus (descending,
kenotic, in solidarity with human beings) is expressed in terms di-
rectly opposite to those of the latter (Israelite priesthood as ascending,
separatist). This priestly mediation is a feature of Jesus’ whole life,
13 Ibid. p. 82f. See also ‘Sacrifice’ in P. Fink (ed), New Dictionary of Sacramental
Worship (Gill & Macmillan, Dublin, 1990) pp. 1135–7, and ‘Is Christianity Sacrificial or
Anti-Sacrificial’, Religion, 27, (1997) pp. 225–230.
14 R. Daly (1997) p. 238.
15 Two respondents to Robert Daly’s 1997 paper, Paul Duff and Bruce Chilton, argue
for a more dominant trajectory in the New Testament, suggesting that Christianity did not
at first reject the Temple (see Matthew 5.23-24; Acts 2.46; 5.42; 21.17-26). Nor should we
reject the historical circumstances by which Christianity became separated from sacrificial
worship, namely the destruction of the Temple in 70 CE and its demolition in 135 CE. The
replacement of the Temple is a matter of history, not of Christian or Rabbinic theology.
Chilton stresses the dangers of “scapegoating sacrifice” and insists that “the denial of
sacrifice is the last bulwark, and perhaps the strongest, of Christian exceptionalism’. See
Paul Duff, ‘The Sacrificial Character of Earliest Christianity: A Response to Robert J.
Daly’s “Is Christianity Sacrificial or Anti-Sacrifical”, Religion, 27 (1997) pp. 245–248, and
Bruce Chilton, ‘Sacrificial Mimesis’ in Religion, 27 (1997) pp. 225–230.
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and not just his death: above all, his priesthood and sacrifice were
exercised ‘existentially and not ritually’.16
Jesus’ self-renunciation is an acquiescence to ‘de-mastery’ (a re-
versal both of Oedipal conflict and the Hegelian struggle for recog-
nition). It is a sacrificial ‘letting-be’, Jesus’ kenotic ‘consent to his
condition as Son-in-humanity and as Brother of humanity’. Chauvet
prefers to describe this as ‘anti-sacrifice’. In any case, the language
of sacrifice, whatever authority it may acquire in the New Testament,
is not necessary to describe the meaning of Jesus’ life and death,
and remains only one symbolism among others. It should certainly
have its place, but not a privileged status. The sacrifice of Jesus is
so singular that he wonders, with Girard, whether the word is even
appropriate. Chauvet has serious reservations about Girard’s account
of sacrifice as a scapegoating mechanism, and of Jesus’ unmasking
and denunciation of this mechanism,17 but he builds on Girard’s in-
sights so far as to propose a third term, “anti-sacrifice”, between the
Girardian dichotomy of sacrifice and non-sacrifice (as we have seen
above this “anti-sacrificial” position in fact coincides with Girard’s
considered view on the matter). Such a position steers clear of a
“gnostic” denial of the sacrificial pattern within each of us, recogniz-
ing instead the never-ending task of conversion: ‘The anti-sacrificial
regimen to which the gospel calls us rests upon the sacrificial, but
it does so to turn it around and thereby to redirect ritual practice’.
It is in ethical practice where the ritual practice is verified.18 In its
Christological setting, the language of cult or sacrifice is used only
with reference to Christ, and to the daily life of Christians who were
called ‘a living sacrifice, a royal priesthood, a temple holy to God’.19
(McKenna: 389) For Chauvet, the evidence points to ‘an undeniable
anti-sacrificial and anti-priestly subversion. . . . From now on . . . the
sacred work, the cult, the sacrifice that is pleasing to God, is the con-
fession of faith lived in the agape of sharing in service to the poorest,
of reconciliation and of mercy.’20
What he asserts as the ‘basic principle’ is drawn from Augustine:
‘Christ, who was offered (sacrificed) once for all, is offered “everyday
in sacrament” (quotidie in sacramento)’ – a formula distinct from
“everyday in the sacrament”. Augustine illustrates this process of
interiorization and spiritualization described above. He understands
Christ’s passion as a perfect sacrifice, a complete surrender to God:
this is rooted in an ecclesial sense of our unity with Christ, whereby
the gifts of bread and wine, which represent the sufferings of the
16 L-M. Chauvet, Op. Cit., p. 299.
17 Ibid., pp. 303–6.
18 Ibid., p. 307.
19 J.H. McKenna, Op. Cit., p. 389.
20 L-M. Chauvet, Op. Cit., p. 260.
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faithful, are joined to the Christ-victim. There is no question here of
overcoming alienation or of expiation of sin: in fact, the ‘work of
sacrifice’ itself constitutes fellowship with God, rather than being a
means towards it. It arises from a sense of identity and union already
achieved: the indissoluble marriage (without confusion) of Christ and
the Church. At the altar we are exhorted to ‘be what you see, and
receive what you are’:
So then, the true sacrifices are acts of compassion, whether towards
ourselves or towards our neighbours, when they are directed towards
God; and acts of compassion are intended to free us from misery and
thus to bring us to happiness – which is only attained by that good
of which it has been said, ‘As for me, my true good is to cling to
God’. This being so, it immediately follows that the whole redeemed
community, that is to say, the congregation and fellowship of the saints,
is offered to God as a universal sacrifice, through the great Priest, who
offered Himself in his suffering for us – so that we might be the body
of so great a head- under ‘the form of a servant’ . . .. Thus the Apostle
first exhorts us to offer our bodies as a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable
to God, as the reasonable homage we owe him, and not to be ‘con-
formed’ to this age, but to be ‘re-formed’ in newness of mind to prove
what is the will of God – namely what is good, what is acceptable to
God, what is perfect because we ourselves are that whole sacrifice . . . .
This is the sacrifice of Christians, who are ‘many making up one body
in Christ’. This is the sacrifice which the Church continually celebrates
in the sacrament of the altar, a sacrament well-known to the faithful
where it is shown to the Church that she herself is offered in the
offering which she presents to God.21
Part Two: After Sacrifice? The Pedagogy of Filiation
While the “anti-sacrificial” convergence of writers such as Chauvet,
Girard, Daly and others is impressive, serious questions remain. The
argument runs that Augustine’s symbolic discourse comes later on (by
the eleventh century) to seem less than adequately “realistic”. There
is a persistent temptation to regress to the “normatively” sacrificial;
though the reasons for the reversion, in the third and fourth centuries,
to the earlier understanding of sacrifice as immolation are complex.
Chauvet suggests that after the conversion of Constantine, the influx
of pagans and the new civic role for Christian clergy led to a renewal
of the “cultic” model. The subsequent eclipse of the congregation at
the eucharistic worship, Chauvet describes as the ‘confiscation of the
baptismal priesthood of the entire people of God by the priests’.22
From a modern perspective, this is in many ways an attractive nar-
rative, but one needs to ask whether it runs just too smoothly. Is it
21 St Augustine, The City of God, Book X.6.
22 L-M. Chauvet, Op. Cit., p. 309.
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in fact adequate to designate all examples of descriptive or “really
existing” sacrifice as simply regressive? What is missing in particular
from the reading of Augustine on sacrifice is the dimension of Eu-
charist as an oppositional practice, performed in a world which hates
the Christian and seeks their destruction. The most striking counter-
example is the association of Eucharist and martyrdom which we
find in Ignatius of Antioch, who desires to be poured out as a liba-
tion, and to be made purest wheat by the teeth of the wild beasts.23
We may judge Ignatius’ use of such metaphors to be edging towards
the pathological:24 can we say the same of his desire that his deeds
should be eloquent, that he should ‘be a word of God . . . [instead of]
again a (mere) voice’?
We shall return to another aspect raised here: for Ignatius, the
martyr ideal is not straightforwardly one of visible representation at
all; it is only when he ‘does not appear to the world’ that he will truly
be a Christian: ‘For good does not reside in what our eyes can see;
the fact that Jesus Christ is now within the Father is why we perceive
him so much the more clearly. For the work we have to do is no
affair of persuasive speaking; Christianity lies in achieving greatness
in the face of the world’s hatred.’25 Despite a very strong narrative
theme which relies very much upon representation and visibility (the
Letter envisages a triumphal procession from the east to Rome) the
author yearns in fact to be completely eaten up so as to disappear
from view; thus effecting his transformation into a true disciple.
Is it possible to sustain the rich associations without some recourse
to the notion of “sacrifice”? As is now widely recognised, and as
Chauvet has reiterated, the sacrificial theme is only one of several
metaphors for Christ’s saving action. David Power emphasises the
‘redescription’ which has taken place: the Cross of Christ ‘replaced
the rites of sacrifice with the table of Christ’s body and blood’.26
In the death of Christ, all other sacrifices are fulfilled and rendered
obsolete, and there is a movement away from a focus on cult or
rite, towards seeing the Eucharist as ‘outside the series’ of all earlier
sacrificial rituals: ‘a totally different kind of reality [which] realised
superabundantly the end and purpose of sacrifice’.27 The heart of the
23 We should, of course, recognise the possibility that this last declaration may not in
fact be a reference to the Eucharist at all.
24 The ground is well covered: see Droge and Tabor, A Noble Death: Suicide and
Martyrdom among Christians and Jews in Antiquity (Harper, San Francisco, 1992), and
R.G. Tanner, ‘Martyrdom in St Ignatius of Antioch and the Stoic View of Suicide’ in E.A.
Livingstone (ed), Studia Patristica, 16.2 (Academic Verlag, Berlin, 1985) pp. 201–205.
25 St Ignatius of Antioch, Epistle to the Romans 3, in Early Christian Writings: The Apos-
tolic Fathers, translated by Maxwell Staniforth (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1968)
p. 104.
26 D. Power, The Eucharistic Mystery (1992) p. 320.
27 Ibid., p. 321.
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problem for Power is the need to “demythologize” the concept of sac-
rifice in the contemporary world. For Power, the Christian use of the
term “sacrifice” is a ‘language of reversal’, a movement away from
appeasement or magical repulsion, towards a stress on ‘a communion
of solidarity in love in God’s spirit that withstands human judgement
and prevails in the midst of suffering’.28 We are speaking here of a
reversal, a metaphorical ‘story-power’ which speaks of the triumph
of good, life and light over evil, death and darkness.
But can such a demythologised ‘story power’ be intense and co-
herent enough to engage the modern imagination? David Ford in Self
and Salvation (pp.2-6) offers six interconnecting questions or criteria
for an acceptable doctrine of salvation29 and it becomes necessary to
specify just how the root metaphor of sacrifice fits in here, given that
part of its power is precisely its inadequacy. Understood here as a
language of reversal, can the notion of sacrifice sustain, once again,
a ‘journey of intensification’?
As we have seen, for Keenan, the task is to ‘dwell’ within the
paradox of sacrifice rather than seek to dissolve it. In this respect
we may refer to two pieces of ‘unfinished business’: the question
of propitiation,30 and the reductive understanding of the Eucharist as
a non-sacrificial banquet (the fear expressed by Pope John Paul II
in Eucharistia de Ecclesia). Perhaps each of these represent the be-
setting temptation of one of the theological options spelt out at the
beginning of this paper, in which the paradox of sacrifice has been dis-
solved, rather than maintained. A “sacrificial” approach, if there is an
overemphasis on the propitiatory or expiatory dimension, may tempt
us to stay with an archaic, and possibly pathological, valorisation of
divinely-sanctioned violence. However, a “non-sacrificial” approach,
which congratulates itself on having left behind the messiness of sac-
rifice once and for all, will tempt us to sit down prematurely, as it
were, to the eschatological banquet.31 In Pauline terms, we have the
28 D. Power, ‘Sacramental Theology: A Review of Literature’ (1994), p. 322f.
29 Ford asks: does this theology of salvation go to the heart of Christian identity, doing
justice to the specificity of the Gospel narrative, the face of Jesus Christ, as well as its
universal implications? Is this theology widely accessible today? Does this theology have
practical fruitfulness, in what Ford describes as the three main dynamics of Christian living:
worship and prayer; living and learning in community; and speech, action and suffering
for justice, freedom, peace, goodness and truth? Finally is this theology defensible against
diverse attacks, and can it anticipate and deal with the main criticisms and alternatives.
30 Given new life by the controversy of the Passion film of Mel Gibson: see Simon
Barrow and Jonathan Bartley (eds), Consuming Passion: Why the Killing of Jesus Really
Matters (DLT, London, 2005). The editors of this book express their concern that the
popularity of the film and the undiscriminating use of this film as a tool for evangelisation
have served to perpetuate pathological notions of penal substitution.
31 Discussion of this theme at the CTA conference 2006 drew attention to the oddness
of the Eucharistic ‘meal’ as it normally occurs: food which is queued for and consumed
standing is more reminiscent of a soup kitchen or a fast food outlet than a leisurely banquet,
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Galatian community, which hearkens nostalgically to certitudes of a
sacrificial past, and the Corinthian community, which has moved too
quickly into a non-sacrificial, angelic future. Once again, it seems
the place to be is within the paradox of ‘sacrificing sacrifice’, the
place of ‘anti-sacrifice’ as Chauvet understands it. And yet perhaps
here the risks are greater, since both temptations are present: forget-
ting the bloodiness of Calvary, or relapsing from Easter innocence.
And the vocabulary of “sacrifice” remains treacherous as ever.
A reformulation of the sacrificial understanding of Eucharist will
need to take account of the insights and challenges set out above. It
will have to acknowledge a fundamental dilemma: on the one hand,
there is John Milbank’s warning about how ‘the modern, enlightened
reasoners about sacrifice found themselves captured by sacrificial rea-
son’, on the other hand the dangers, stressed by Chauvet and Keenan,
of ever thinking that we have escaped from sacrificial reason. Can we
do without “sacrifice”? While I wish to acknowledge the insights that
are afforded by the non-sacrificial and sacrificial “camps”, it would
seem that the approaches which we have designated (with Chauvet) as
“anti-sacrificial” best recognise the ‘treacherous’ nature of sacrificial
language and concepts.
For all the difficulties associated with it, sacrifice, understood as
‘a necessary passage through suffering and/or death on the way to
a supreme moment of transcendental truth’ (Keenan) remains one of
the most potent metaphors of salvation. We have noted David Ford’s
six criteria for an adequate soteriology. How does our understanding
of eucharistic sacrifice match up to these? My specific proposal is
that an articulation of the Johannine notion of a pedagogy of filiation
may do much of the work which we have traditionally required from
the doctrine of sacrifice.
The guiding texts are John 15.12-15, and the citation by Girard and
Chauvet of the two biblical ‘founding narratives’: Genesis chapters 1-
3, and the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel.32 For Chauvet, the sacrifice
of Jesus rests in his ‘reversing the fundamental sin of Israel, which
is also the paradigmatic sin of humankind’,33 namely the living in
relation to God in a pattern of force and competition, classically
expressed in Hegel’s master-slave dialectic and in Freud’s Oedipus
complex. In response to an Adamic grabbing, Christ’s kenotic self-
offering points to a ‘de-mastery’, a ‘letting-be’ of God. His sacrificial
death is to be understood as a two-fold consent: ‘to his condition as
suggesting that unease with the meal symbolism is implicit in how we actually celebrate
the sacrament.
32 See Rene´ Girard, ‘The Logos of Heraclitus and the Logos of John’ in Things Hidden
Since the Foundation of the World (University Press, Stanford, Ca., 1987) pp. 263–280.
33 L-M. Chauvet, Op. Cit., p. 299.
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Son-in-humanity and as Brother of humanity’,34 which is a corrective
of the slave’s acquisitiveness and the master’s desire for control. It
corresponds less to a strictly sacrificial pattern than to the initiatory
pattern of ‘dying to live’. One thinks here of Jesus’ most powerful
parable, in which the lost son is suspended for a moment between
the status of a slave and that of son, until the father makes clear the
restoration of his dignity:
One sees what is at stake in what we call the anti-sacrificial: not the
negation of the sacrificial or of a part of it (its dimension of reconcil-
iation), but the task to convert all the sacrificial to the gospel in order
to live it, not in a servile, but in a filial (and hence in a brotherly and
sisterly) manner. This is precisely why the realization of this intimate
association, based on our common filiation, by the ethical practice of
reconciliation between human beings, constitutes the premier place of
our “sacrifice.” This is what the anti-sacrifice of the Eucharist shows
us and enjoins us to do.35
Hence the Eucharist is indeed once again a ‘dangerous memory’,
because of this transfiguration of identities, and because of the fear-
some ethical responsibilities that follow from it. As Chauvet insists,
the sacrificial kenosis which we commemorate in our Eucharist frees
us from grabbing after divinity, because we are, after all, sons and
daughters; but nor will it allow us to abdicate our human responsi-
bility as brothers and sisters, by leaving everything up to a falsely
transcendent and non-incarnate God.
Conclusion
The scholarly consensus seems to be as follows. If the concept is
carefully circumscribed, and with an explicit distancing from cruder
usages of sacrifice, and if the link with the all-sufficient self-gift of
Christ is maintained, then to speak of Christian sacrifice is legiti-
mate. This is more than a question of careful language: Daly (fol-
lowing Girard) insists that there should be an express recognition in
official teaching that ‘the Christ event did away with sacrifice in the
“history-of-religions” sense of the word i.e. demanding immolation
or destruction’. As J. McKenna points out, our language is ‘anti-
sacrificial’ in the sense of moving beyond immolation to ‘a spiritual
sacrifice which serves to transform the world’: quoting Chauvet, ‘the
ethical practice of reconciliation between human beings, constitutes
the premier place of our sacrifice. That is what the anti-sacrifice of
the Eucharist shows us and enjoins us to do.’
34 Ibid., p. 301.
35 Ibid., p. 311.
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The demarcation for Chauvet is ‘between a servile attitude and a
filial attitude with regard to the entire sacrificial order’. This is a
process of demythologisation, but with limits. Like Keenan, Chauvet
thinks it unlikely that we can simply jettison the idea of sacrifice, and
in particular that the eucharist can conceivably be celebrated with-
out mythic residue, in the form of archaic sacrificial symbolism. His
conclusion as to the ‘risks and opportunities of the vocabulary of
sacrifice’ demands that for pastoral reasons it be used with care –
even as the vocabulary remains ineradicable.36 For Chauvet, as for
Keenan and Daly, what matters is the process by which this vocab-
ulary takes on new dimensions. The “anti-sacrificial” process is a
pedagogical one, of learning how not to be slaves and how to be
sons and daughters.37
Will this do? It will certainly be inadequate for those who insist on
“sacrificial” or “non-sacrificial” understandings, as we have set out
these terms earlier. I began this paper with a graphic cinematic image
from Shooting Dogs – the two “gatherings”, inside and outside the
compound fence. Both are “sacrificial”; both are ‘what we do’. Only
by seeing the genocidal mob, our brothers and sisters, as a mirror
of our costly eucharistic self-giving, do we begin to discern what
eucharistic sacrifice might mean.
Immolation, in short, is not necessary for eucharistic sacrifice –
but it is what happens, in some circumstances, to people who try to
live eucharistically. To be a disciple is to be soberly aware of this
possibility, and to be ready for it – by the same token, however, to
accept that for much of the time and for many of us, this potential
will not be actualised. Traditionally, it is the language and devotion
of martyrdom which has articulated this truth: but this discourse is
itself also undergoing transition.38 If it is the case that an “anti-
sacrificial” discourse has emerged, an “exodus from sacrifice”, this
can only be a true exodus by being mindful of previous enslavement,
and by re-living it so as to commemorate liberation. Finally, as the
renewed discourse about martyrdom has made clear, the questions of
authenticity and transparency of witness come to the fore, and even
their impossibility in a culture where suspicion of even the grandest
36 Ibid., p. 315f.
37 I am indebted to the Catholic Theological Association and to Dr Laurence Hemming
for comments on this paper. I would also like to acknowledge the book by Matthew
Levering, Sacrifice and Community: Jewish Offering and Christian Eucharist (Blackwell,
Oxford, 2006) which, while highly pertinent to this discussion, appeared too late for me
take it into account.
38 See Karl Rahner’s argument for a renewed and expanded conception for martyrdom for
the modern age in ‘Dimensions of Martyrdom: A Plea for the Broadening of a Classical
Concept’, Concilium, 163, pp. 9–12. By recognising in this article the complexities of
contemporary martyrdom, Rahner moves away from his earlier optimism about martyrdom
being a “suprasacrament”; see On the Theology of Death (Herder, Freiburg, 1961) and his
other writings on Christian death in Theological Investigations, volumes VII and IX.
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of narratives holds sway. Who, in the end, authenticates the martyr?
and who judges our sacrifices to be “acceptable”? Chauvet asserts:
Properly understood, this (anti-) sacrificial language thus reveals one
of the constitutive dimensions of Christian identity. And its Eucharis-
tic “expression” reveals in an exemplary way the process by which
Christians come into the truth of their identity.39
The claim, in the end, is comparatively modest. Not everything comes
to expression. As well as the great anti-sacrificial drama, there are
other constitutive dimensions, whose tone is silence, inarticulacy, in-
visibility: as we see once again in Ignatius’ desire to ‘disappear’; in
Augustine’s self-offering ‘everyday in sacrament’, in Rahner’s revi-
sion of the ‘supra-sacramentality’ of martyrdom, and Keenan’s ten-
sion between the ‘aneconomical’ and economical orders of sacrifice
to a Father who rewards ‘in secret’.
Dr Michael Kirwan SJ
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39 L-M. Chauvet, Op. Cit., p. 316.
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